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A simplified prisoner’s game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their
neighbors can follow two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players
updated in random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability
depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques we
study the density c of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition
between the two absorbing state when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits c → 0
and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.50.+q, 05.50.+j, 64.60.Ht
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games were intro-
duced by Axelrod [1] to study the emergence of cooper-
ation rather than exploitation among selfish individuals.
Since the pioneering work of Axelrod this approach has
become a fruitful tool in the area of political and behavior
sciences, biology and economics [2–4].
In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game each of two play-
ers have to decide simultaneously whether it wishes to
cooperate with the other or to defect. The rewards de-
pendent on their choices are expressed by 2×2 payoff ma-
trices in agreement with the four possibilities. Assuming
symmetric game the players get rewards R (P ) if both
choose to cooperate (defect). In the remaining two cases
the defector’s and cooperator’s payoff are T (temptation
to defect) and S (sucker’s payoff) respectively. The el-
ements of payoff matrix satisfy the following conditions:
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. In this game the
mutual cooperation leads to the highest total (average)
payoff. The highest individual payoff (T ) can only be
reached against the other player decreasing the average
payoff. These features makes the PD game so interesting
in the mentioned areas.
In earlier studies N contestants played an iterated
round-robin prisoner’s dilemma game. The population of
contestants, which apply different algorithms to choose
between defection and cooperation in the knowledge of
previous decisions, was modified according to a Dar-
winian selection rule round by round. For example, elim-
inating the worst player the best one will have an off-
spring inheriting the parent’s strategy. In a different in-
terpretation, the worst player adopts the best algorithm.
Computer tournaments (simulations) were performed to
study how the population of contestants varies with time
[1]. Evidently, the final (stationary) state depends on
the initial population. The simulations have clarified the
emergence of mutual cooperation among all the players
under some conditions. In these tournaments the winner
the so-called ’Tit for Tat’ (TFT) algorithm has a crucial
role. This very simple algorithm cooperates in the first
round and later it reciprocates the partner’s previous de-
cision. It forces the players to cooperate mutually and
maintains this state against defectors.
Beside the homogeneous system with players following
TFT algorithm, the state where all the players choose
to defect has proved to be stationary too, more precisely,
spare cooperators will be suppressed due to the evolution-
ary rule in the large N limit. More precisely, only a suf-
ficiently large portion of mutual cooperators can survive
among defectors. The emergence of uniform cooperation
becomes easier when – combining the evolutionary game
with spatial effects – the players interact much more with
their neighbors than with those who are far away as it is
typical in real populations. The spatial effects promote
the survival of cooperators even if we do not use any kind
of elaborate strategies such as the TFT.
Recently Nowak and May [5] have introduced a spatial
evolutionary PD game. In this model individuals located
on a lattice play with their neighbors and with them-
self. The strategical complexities and memories of past
encounters are neglected by considering only two sim-
ple kinds of individuals: those who cooperate (C) and
those who defect (D) unconditionally. The evolutionary
rule was also simplified by using discrete time steps. Be-
tween two rounds individuals adopt the strategy that has
received the highest payoff among its neighbors includ-
ing themself. This deterministic model is equivalent to
a two-state cellular automaton where the next state at
a given lattice point is determined by the states on the
surrounding points. The outcome depends on the initial
configuration and the rescaled payoff matrix described
by a single parameter b characterizing the measure of
temptation to defect (see the matrix in Sec. 2). This
model with and without self-interaction was investigated
on different lattice structures (square, triangle, cubic).
The most exhaustive analysis is performed on a square
lattice taking into account the interactions with the first
and second neighbors and self-interaction. Nowak and
May observed a rich variety of spatial and temporal dy-
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namics dependent on the value of b. For example, the co-
operators can invade the word of defectors along straight
border lines while defectors gain along irregular bound-
aries for a given interval of b. Furthermore, the above
rules conserve the symmetries of the initial state for ad-
equate boundary conditions. Due to the discrete nature
of total payoff there appear sharp steps when varying b.
Introducing stochastic evolutionary rules between two
rounds Nowak et al. [6] have extended the above model.
Although the stochasticity simplifies the dynamics it
does not change the basic observations that cooperators
and defectors can coexist. The randomness destroys the
straight border lines as well as other symmetries that
appear in the deterministic model.
Hubermann and Glance [7] have studied a similar
model using continuous time simulations where players
are chosen randomly and immediately updated. Their
results support that the above conclusions are not af-
fected by whether we use continuous or discrete time in
the stochastic case [6].
In the present work we study a PD game with a slightly
different continuous time evolution on square lattice. In
the modified model the players need less intelligence to
decide whether they adopt one of the neighboring strat-
egy or not. Using systematic Monte Carlo simulations
and generalized mean-field techniques we calculate the
density of cooperators as a function of b for different noise
levels. It will be shown that the transitions from the ac-
tive state (coexistence of defectors and cooperators) to
the absorbing ones (all D or all C) exhibit universal be-
havior.
II. THE MODEL
The players located on a square lattice can follow only
two simple strategies: C (always cooperate) and D (al-
ways defect). Due to this simplification this system can
be handled with the Ising formalism and we can use the
sophisticated techniques developed in non-equilibrium
statistical physics. Each player plays a PD game with
itself and with its neighbors. The total payoff of a cer-
tain player is the sum over all interactions. The elements
of payoff matrix can be rescaled because the evolutionary
rule depends on the payoff differences between the play-
ers. Accepting the idea suggested by Nowak and May [5]
we choose R = 1, P = S = 0 and T = b. Thus, the
payoff to player A against B is given by the matrix:
A
B C D
C 1 0
D b 0
where b > 1.
Two systems will be considered subsequently. In the
first case only the first neighbors are taken into account.
This means that the total payoff of a defector surrounded
by cooperators is 4b while the cooperator’s payoff is 5 in
the same surroundings. In the second case the neighbor-
hood includes the first- and second-neighbors. Thus the
payoffs of the defector and cooperator are 8b and 9 in the
sea of cooperators.
The randomly chosen player X revises its strategy ac-
cording to the following rules. This player selects one of
its neighbours Y with equal probability. Given the total
payoffs (EX and EY ) from the previous round, player X
adopts the neighbor’s strategy with the probability:
W =
1
1 + exp [−(EY − EX)/K]
(1)
where EY is the neighbor’s payoff and K characterizes
the noise introduced to permit irrational choices. For
successful strategy adoptation the new state as well as
the new payoffs are updated. Notice that the decision
is not affected by the variation of total payoff involving
the change in the surroundings. Starting from a random
initial state the above process is repeated many times.
For K = 0 the player X adopts Y ’s strategy if EY >
EX . In this case the randomness is represented by the
selection of the players X and Y . The finite value of K
characterizes the range of payoff difference within which
the irrational decision can typically appear. At present,
our analysis is constrained to noise levels K < 1.
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are performed varying
the value of b for fixedK values. We have determined the
density c of cooperators using periodic boundary condi-
tions. The system size was varied from L = 200 to 1000;
the large sizes are required to suppress the statistical er-
ror in the critical regions (c→ 0 or 1).
The above models are also investigated by the gen-
eralized mean-field technique that proved to be very
efficient for studying dynamical systems such as the
one-dimensional stochastic cellular automata [8–10] and
driven lattice gases [11–13]. In fact the introduction of
the above evolutionary rule is motivated by the demand
to make the model more convenient for this method. In
the present case we have adapted the two-dimensional
method to determine the probability of the configura-
tions appearing on 2-, 4-, 5- and 6-point clusters [13]. It
is expected that the larger the cluster we use the more
accurate the prediction given by this technique. At the
level of 6-point approximation – taking the consistency
conditions and symmetries into account – we have to de-
termine 20 parameters by solving a set of equation of mo-
tions for the configuration probabilities in the stationary
state. Details of this calculations are given in previous
papers [12,13].
III. RESULTS
For both models the c = 0 (all D) and 1 (all C) states
are independent of time because the evolutionary rule
cannot create a new strategy which can spread away un-
der advantageous conditions. The uniform cooperation
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(c = 1) is a stable state if b does not exceed a threshold
value bc1 which is larger than 1. This means that any
constellation of defectors will be defeated if b < bc1. In
the same way the c = 0 state remains stable for b > bc2.
Henceforth we will concentrate on those states which the
cooperators and defector can coexist in, that is, when
bc1 < b < bc2.
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FIG. 1. Density of cooperators as a function of tempta-
tion to defect for K = 0.1. The MC data are plotted by
squares, the results of generalized mean-field technique for
different cluster sizes are indicated by long-dashed (2), dot-
ted (4), dashed (5) and solid (6) lines.
First we consider the model with first-neighbor inter-
actions. Figure 1 shows the b-dependence of the density
c of cooperators in the coexistence region for K = 0.1.
As indicated c decreases monotonously with increasing
b until the second threshold bc2 where the cooperators
vanish.
FIG. 2. Distribution of cooperators (white boxes) and de-
fectors (black boxes) for b = 1.4 and T = 0.1 (c = 0.515).
The results of both the MC simulations and the gener-
alized mean-field method refer to step-like behavior be-
coming more and more striking if we decrease the value
of K. The sharp steps appear at the break points (e.g.
b = 4/3, 3/2) described by Nowak and May [5]. Inside
the coexistence region the mean-field results of 4-, 5- and
6-point approximations agree satisfactorily with the sim-
ulations while the pair approximation yields well-marked
difference. The best agreement is found for the 5-point
approximations (dashed line).
A typical snapshot on the steadt state distribution of
cooperators and defectors is illustrated in Fig. 2 for b =
0.4 and T = 0.1. This snapshot as well as the subsequent
ones are a 100× 100 portion of the full 400× 400 lattice.
In this case the pair- (2-point) approximation gives a
satisfactory description of the short-range correlations.
Notice furthermore that the mean-field predictions are
not adequate when c tends either to 0 or 1. Namely,
the 4- and 6-point approximations predict a continuous
(linear) transition, the 5-point approximation indicates a
first-order one while the simulations suggest power law
behavior if c→ 0. Similar situation has already been ob-
served for a one-dimensional stochastic cellular automa-
ton [10]. The mentioned deviations are not surprising be-
cause the mean-field approximations are not capable to
handle the critical transitions exhibiting enhanced fluc-
tuations and long-range correlations.
In the limit c → 0 the cooperators can survive if they
form scattered colonies in the background of defectors
as illustrated in Fig. 3. In general, any compact colony
formation would be more preferable for cooperators, how-
ever, the defectors make them rare.
FIG. 3. The cooperators (white boxes) form colonies in the
sea of defectors (black boxes) when their density goes to 0.
Visualizing the time-dependent configuration one can
observe how the colonies try to spread away. Their
center, size and shape change continuously and a sep-
arated colony can disappear without trace. Two colonies
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can unite providing better opportunity for their survival,
or oppositely, a colony can divide into two (or more)
parts. Similar phenomena can be observed in a wide
range of dynamical processes described by the directed
percolation (DP) [14], the Reggeon field theory [15], the
surface-reaction [16] and Schlo¨gl models [17] as well as the
branching and annihilating random walks [18]. Grass-
berger [19] and Janssen [20] conjectured that all one-
component models with a single absorbing state belong to
the universality class of directed percolation. Exceptions
can appear if the dynamics conserves some symmetries
(e.g. parity of offsprings).
Our MC data (shown in Fig. 1) refer to a power law
behavior, that is
c ∝ (bc2 − b)
β (2)
if b → bc2. The best fit is obtained for bc2 = 1.8472(1)
and β = 0.56(3) which is consistent with the critical ex-
ponent (β ≈ 0.58) of the two-dimensional directed per-
colation [21].
FIG. 4. Typical snapshot for high concentrat ion of coop-
erators (white boxes) for b = 1.222 and T = 0.1. The small
’gangs’ of defectors (black boxes) walk randomly.
Contrary to the above pattern defectors form small
isolated ’gangs’ as demonstrated in Fig. 4 for a typical
stationary state if 1 − c ≪ 1. A single defector sur-
rounded by cooperators has the highest payoff (fitness)
in this system. Sooner or later this defector will have
a neighboring offspring which reduces its payoff immedi-
ately. (This process can be considered as a retaliation
executed by the TFT algorithm if more elaborate strate-
gies are permitted.) If b < 4/3 then one of the defectors
will be defeated within a short time. The iteration of
this process yields randomly walking gangs. Two collid-
ing gangs can unite into one. Due to the possibility of
irrational choices a single gang can divide into two or
can disappear. Shortly, the gangs can be considered as
branching and annihilating random walkers whose criti-
cal behavior belongs to the DP universality class too.
In the deterministic model introduced by Nowak and
May [5] isolated gangs with fixed positions can occur if
1 < b < 4/3. The density of gangs (whose size alternates
cyclically if 5/4 < b < 4/3) depends on the initial state.
In contrary to this feature the homogeneous cooperation
can emerge in the stochastic models even for b > 1 as a
consequence of the random walk and annihilation. Be-
sides, the random walk causes the steady state density
to be independent of the initial state.
Despite the mentioned expectation the MC data in
Fig. 1 do not show any power law behavior in the limit
c → 1. This discrepancy can be resolved by reminding
the reader that the critical behavior is controlled by a
simple function of the diffusion constant and the rates
of branching and annihilation. In the present case these
parameters are strongly non-linear functions of b at low
K. For higher value of K, however, the non-linear con-
tributions are negligible in the close vicinity of bc1 and
we expect the power law behavior to appear clearly. In
order to check this statement we have repeated the same
analyses at higher noise level.
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FIG. 5. Density of cooperators vs. b for K = 0.5
as suggested by MC simulations (squares) and generalized
mean-field approximations whose level is indicated as in
Fig. 1.
The results obtained for K = 0.5 are summarized in
Fig. 5. As expected the MC data show power law behav-
ior for both the limits c → 0 and 1. Detailed numerical
analysis results in bc1 = 1.2687, β = 0.62(5) if c → 0
and bc2 = 1.6644(2), β = 0.59(3) if c → 0. These β val-
ues agree satisfactorily with the corresponding exponent
of DP universality class. Notice, furthermore, that bc1
and bc2 depend on K. The determination of a K − b
phase diagram indicating the active and absorbing states
goes beyond the purpose of the present work. Instead of
it we have studied the model involving second-neighbor
interactions.
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The generalization of our techniques to investigate the
density of cooperators in the second model is straight-
forward. The results of these calculations (see Fig. 6)
refer to a behavior similar to those of the previous ver-
sion. There are some minor differences. For example,
the threshold values (bc1 and bc2) are definitely smaller
than those of the previous model. Furthermore, the con-
vergence of the results of generalized mean-field approx-
imation is slow. This fact indicates that the short-range
correlations become more relevant if we take the second-
neighbor interactions into account.
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
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0.0
0.5
1.0
c
FIG. 6. Density of cooperators as a function of b for the
model taking the second neighbor interactions into account
at K = 0.02. Results are indicated as in Fig. 1.
The steps of the continuous c(b) function (for b = 8/7,
7/6, 6/5 and 5/4) becomes sharper when decreasing the
value of K. For high noise levels the function becomes
smooth and exhibits power law behavior with exponents
close to the DP value at both ends of the active region.
Inside the active phase the difference between the mean-
field results and MC simulations decreases with increas-
ing K.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the evolution of cooperation among
players who can follow only two simple strategies (C and
D) and are placed on a square lattice. The individual re-
ceives payoffs from interactions with each of its neighbors
and itself in a PD confrontation. An evolutionary rule is
introduced by slightly modifying the model suggested by
Nowak et al [6]. Namely, a randomly chosen player is to
adopt one of its neighboring strategy with a probability
dependent on the payoff difference. Two versions of the
model have been investigated. In the first case the neigh-
borhood is limited to the first-neighbors. In the second
case we have increased the number of neighbors by taking
into consideration the second-neighbors too.
The MC simulations have given direct evidence of the
existence of two absorbing states (c = 1 if b < bc1 and
c = 0 if b > bc2). It is remarkable that the homogeneous
cooperation proved to be stable against the temptation
to defect for 1 < b < bc1 due to the randomness and pos-
sibility of irrational choice. We have found significantly
different (K-dependent) threshold values in the models
we are interested in. It is expected that bc1 tends to 1 if
we increase the number of neighbors.
For high density of defectors the cooperators form-
ing compact blocks can spread if b < bc2. Comparing
the present models with the corresponding determinis-
tic versions [5] we can state that the active region is
reduced by the stochasticity. For example, in the de-
terministic version of our second model a competition
between the C and D invasion processes can be observed
if 9/5 < b < 2 because the cooperators invade along
straight lines meanwhile the defectors win along irreg-
ular boundaries. In this parameter range Mukherji et
al. [22] have observed that the cooperation is eliminated
when introducing stochastic elements. This is not sur-
prising because the C invasion along straight lines is not
permitted in the stochastic models. At lower value of b,
however, the spatial effects can facilitate the survival of
cooperators [6,23]. In the present stochastic model the
second threshold value of b is decreased by the random-
ness, namely, we have found bc2 < 1.4 for K = 0.02, 0.1
and 0.5 .
The generalized mean-field approximations have clari-
fied the importance of short range correlations for both
versions of the stochastic evolutionary PD game inside
the coexistence region. Unfortunately, this technique is
not applicable in the critical regions (c→ 0 and 1) where
long-range correlations and fluctuations play a dominant
role.
In these critical regions the MC simulations indicated
clearly power law behavior, namely c ∝ (bc2 − b)
β and
1 − c ∝ (b − bc1)
β) at sufficiently high noise levels. The
values of β deduced from the MC data agree well with the
DP exponent for both versions. These findings corrobo-
rate the conjecture according to which the transitions in
all one-component models to an absorbing state belong
to the DP universality class in the absence of conserved
symmetries. The curiosity of the present model is that
here we have two different (non-symmetric) absorbing
states whose stability regions are separated by the active
phase. For low values of K the appearance of power law
behavior against b is distorted by the strongly nonlinear
b-dependence of the diffusion and annihilation. Due to
the robustness of DP universality class similar critical be-
havior is expected for many other versions of stochastic
evolutionary rules.
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